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1. Introduction
The Collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 marked one of the most consequential
geopolitical changes in the contemporary history of East Asia, and historians often connect this
dynasty’s crumbling to both the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s as well as the Xinhai Revolution
in 1911. The ferocious Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement was undoubtedly a significant
event in modern Chinese history. Led by Hong Xiuquan, this armed rebellion persisted for over
14 years, covering 18 provinces; yet the Qing Dynasty lived on. On the contrary, the Xinhai
Revolution of 1911, within four months and fifteen days, achieved the objective that Hong
Xiuquan could not attain in fourteen years: overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. Therefore, it is
particularly meaningful to investigate a core question: why did the Qing Dynasty survive the
Taiping Rebellion yet crumbled upon the Revolution of 1911? In this paper, the author argues
that the Qing dynasty survived the Taiping Rebellion yet crumbled upon the Xinhai Revolution
because the latter’s core ideology, Three Principles of the People, drew support from within the
Qing regional governments by creating the prospect of maintaining power for Qing officials,
while the Taiping Rebellion’s mob ideology achieved the contrary; in addition, the Revolution of
1911 faced a weakened imperial dynasty due to its internal conflicts over constitutional reforms,
successfully prevented foreign powers from aiding the imperial dynasty — two conditions absent
for the Taiping Rebellion.
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2. Differences in Ideologies Between the Taiping Rebellion and the Revolution of 1911
2.1 Taiping Rebellion’s Counterproductive Mob Ideology
Even though members of the Taiping Rebellion claimed to be champions of “God,” it
was, in fact, a facade used to conceal the reality that they were merely driven by a self-serving
mob ideology; it was this very ideology that doomed the rebellion to ruin as it cut off its hope to
break the Qing dynasty from the inside. According to Chinese Among Others: Emigration in
Modern Times by historian Philip A. Kuhn, from 1753 to 1832, China experienced a period of
rapid population growth, leading to “a 43% decrease of cultivated area per capita.”1 In other
words, every Chinese farmer lost nearly 8 acres of arable land, causing a substantial increase in
famines throughout China, especially in the South where the population boomed. This was the
condition that the ordinary Chinese people were in.
Taking advantage of the situation of famine and poverty, Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the
Taiping Rebellion, offered the people a religion whose creeds included “people who believe in
other religions give joy up to ask for pain,” and “faithful followers shall receive all food as
presents from the ‘God Emperor,’” whom Hung claimed to be his father in his publication
Instructions on the Original Way to Save the World.2 Those farmers and workers who had long
suffered from food shortages under the Qing dynasty’s rule had no idea who this “God Emperor”
was but were quite interested in acquiring food and pleasure. Therefore, more and more people,
who had only been exposed to Chinese folk religions previously, joined the Taiping Army not
because of their devout religious faith in Hung’s newly formed God Worshipping Society but to
acquire food and other resources they desperately needed, hence their mob ideology.
The mob ideology of the Taiping Rebellion resulted in their looter-like characteristics:
when the Taiping Army occupied a city, the surrendered, including both Qing officers and
civilians, would be slaid by mod-like Taiping soldiers and their property would be taken away.
For instance, according to What Happened in Nanking in 1853 by Shen Juanxi, a survivor of the
Taiping Army’s massacre after the 1853 battle of Nanking, following Taiping’s capture of the
historic city, “there were civilians’ bodies all over the streets while soldiers forced yet-to bekilled local people to hand in their wealth by putting machetes on their necks.”3 Massacres that
resemble horror in Nanking in 1853 repeatedly occurred during the Taiping Rebellion yet the
leadership never sought to stop them, proving that both the lower and upper-level members of
the rebellion prioritized satisfying themselves rather than to establish a “heavenly kingdom”
under Hung’s religious teachings.
In addition, this mob ideology led to the ultimate failure of the Taiping Rebellion because
it unintentionally united Qing regional officers against a common enemy in order to preserve
their lives and property. In other words, this mob ideology made it impossible for senior Qing
officials, who possessed enormous fortune, to join the rebellion, causing the slow expansion of
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the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and earning time for the mobilization of Qing dynasty forces.
For example, Bao Lishen, a member of the gentry in Bao Town of Zhejiang Province, led his
men to fight against the Taiping Army invasion for nearly a year, “killing more than thirteen
thousand Taiping soldiers and holding no fewer than ten thousand of them as captives” according
to the research paper “Conflicts Between the Taiping Army and Local Forces” by Dr. Liu Chen. 4
While the battles in Bao Town inflicted heavy losses on the Taiping forces, the Qing dynasty’s
Viceroy of Lianxiang, Zeng Guofan, also realized that the Taiping Army, characterized by its
mob ideology, is life-threatening to him. As recorded in William Rowe’s China’s Last Empire:
the Great Ching, Zeng organized the Xiang Army from “existing regional militia forces to
suppress the Taiping Rebellion.”5 By 1859, Zeng Guofan’s army, aided by gentry like Bao
Lishen, recovered much of Zhejiang province from the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, displaying
the unintended consequence of Taiping’s mob-like mentality of consolidating Qing’s regional
forces.

2.2 Revolution of 1911: The San-min Doctrine (Three Principles of the People) That Broke
Down the Qing Dynasty
Unlike the Taiping Rebellion, the Revolution of 1911 possessed a clear and rational
guiding ideology, the San-min Doctrine, also known as the Three Principles of the People; this
was this very ideology that incited the defection of multiple Qing regional officials by giving
them hopes of preserving and even expanding their powers, therefore resulting a dramatic shift in
power between the imperial and revolutionary forces.
The Revolution of 1911 was led by the Chinese United League, or Tongmenghui, a
merger of multiple revolutionary societies in the late Qing dynasty. The league, headed by Sun
Yat-sen, held a central faith, the San-min Doctrine, an ideology consisting of three aspects:
nationalism (Mínzú), people’s power (Mínquán), and people’s livelihood (Mínshēng). The
founder, Sun Yat-sen, constructed these three principles based on US President Abraham
Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, “a government of the people” corresponds to “Minzu”, “a
government by the people” corresponds to “Mínquán,” and “a government for the people”
corresponds to “Mínshēng.”6 After the formation of this ideology, Sun Yat-sen spared no effort
to promote it. According to Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning published by Stanford
University Press, Sun “announced all three principles in the spring of 1905” and then gave
speeches about “‘San-min Doctrine’ in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris.”7 Upon the establishment of
Tongmenghui, Sun published multiple editorials in domestic newspapers, such as Min Bo, to
advocate for the three principles throughout China.
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In the case of the Revolution of 1911 specifically, the second principle of the San-min
Doctrine, Mínquán, was the deciding factor in the revolution’s success. According to The Three
Principles of the People written by Sun Yat-sen, the principle of Mínquán, literally “people’s
power,” is divided into two parts: “the power of politics and the power of governance.”8 The
“power of politics” is the citizens’ power to express their political will through four methods:
“election, recall, initiative, and referendum.”9 When merely considering this first set of power, it
may even seem counter-productive to gain support from Qing officials since measures, such as
recall and election, would put limits on their power. However, when factoring in the second set
of power, “the power of governance,” the boost that this ideology brought to the revolution
becomes much more intelligible. The “power of governance,” as Sun Yat-sen puts it, is the
“power of administration.”10 It allows officials to make policies in order to govern the very
people who are supposed to be their source of power. On top of this, without laws or rules that
limit regional officials’ power at the moment, they were virtually free to maintain their ruling
status by regulating commerce and the media to control the public, canceling out the checks
established in the “power of politics.” Moreover, according to Electoral History of the Republic
of China, the 1911 Provisional Presidential Election set up by the revolutionists was not a
general election but an indirect one in which “Sun Yat-sen was elected president by
representatives of governors from seventeen provinces.”11 And according to the roster of
governors, Cheng of Jiangsu Province, Zhu of Shandong Province, Zhang of Guangxi and
Guangdong Province and three others were all governors of their respective provinces in the
Qing dynasty and joined the revolutionists in 1911.12 Their preservation of the governorship
proves the probabilities for Qing regional officials to preserve their political powers under the
new government. The fact that the San-min Doctrine grants officials the power to govern and the
government guided by such ideology allowed former Qing officials to preserve powers rather
than ousting all of them are evidence of how the Revolution of 1911 greatly differs from the
Taiping Rebellion half a century ago.
3. The Impact of Foreign Intervention on the Outcomes of the Taiping Rebellion and the
Revolution of 1911
3.1 Foreign Aid to the Qing Dynasty that Doomed the Taiping Rebellion
Other than their ideological differences, the intervention of foreign powers favoring the
Qing dynasty was also a core factor that determined the failure of the Taiping Rebellion. During
the initial stage of the revolt, foreign powers were interested in this self-proclaimed Christian-led
rebellion in China because of its potential to convert over 400 million Chinese into Christians.
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Soon after the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom established its capital in Nanking 1853, many western
powers sent their plenipotentiaries to visit Hung, the heavenly king, including Sir. George
Bonham, the British Minister Counselor to China in 1848-1854. According to The Chinese and
Their Rebellions by Thomas Taylor Meadows, the assistant of Bonham, the minister counselor
was shamed by the arrogant ruler of the Heavenly Kingdom. The Englishman not only found that
Hung asked “England to be a client state of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,” but also that the
Taiping leadership lived extravagant and dissipated lives, often the exact opposite to his
Christian ideals.13 Upon Sir. Bonham’s return to London, he casted serious doubts on the
Christian nature of the Taiping Rebellion and its capability to replace the Qing dynasty as
China’s ruling authority, suggesting London and other European powers not to support the
Taiping regime.14
The beauty of historical research is to discover previously ignored relationships between
critical events in history, and the fact that England did not support the Taiping Army in its earlyto-mid stages, while it still prevailed, also had such a fascinating connection. On October 16th of
the same year that the Taiping Army achieved its grand victory in Nanking, the Crimean War
broke out in Europe. Over two hundred and fifty thousand British troops participated in the
battles, resulting in appropriately seventeen thousand casualties. This massive loss in Crimea
further reduced the British government’s will to intervene in a lengthy Chinese civil war, hence
Britain’s, the most powerful imperial country at the time, neutral stance before 1860.
However, in 1869, the Taiping Army made a move on Shanghai, center of the textile
industry in China, after destroying most of the agricultural industries in the deep South,
threatening the production of crucial commodities for the UK, such as tea and silk. Accordingly,
London had to choose one between the Qing dynasty and the Taiping Rebellion to assist it in
winning the civil war. Days before its planned siege of Shanghai, Taiping announced that it
would ban the trade of opium, alcohol, and tobacco from foreign countries, hoping to gain
popular support in Shanghai. Yet, this plan backfired. Following the Taiping regime’s ban on
opium business, Britain’s primary source of profits in China, London considered the Qing
dynasty to be the better facilitator of British interests. Then, in June of 1860, the UK government
implemented restrictions on all arms sales to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom according to The
History of the Taiping Rebellion, while allowing British merchants to sell rifles and canons to the
Qing Army. Since then, the Taiping Army could only obtain western weapons by smuggling,
which was obviously much more costly and time-consuming.15 Foreigners in Shanghai, aided by
their respective nations, also formed their own militia to resist the Taiping invasion.16 According
to Henry Andres Burgevine, the co-commander of the “Ever-Victorious Army,” a unit of foreign
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mercenaries working on behalf of the Qing dynasty to protect Shanghai, representatives of the
Qing Army could buy a rifle for 15 to 20 silver dollars, a price much lower than usual while the
sales to the Taiping Army was strictly prohibited.17 This meant that however much that the
Taiping Army was willing to pay for western weapons, it was next to impossible for them to
acquire them from the closest source of weapons in China.

3.2 Limited Foreign Intervention during the Revolution of 1911
If the Qing dynasty successfully suppressed the Taiping Rebellion with the assistance of
foreign powers such as Britain, why did not the same outcome reappear in 1911? Primarily, the
leader of revolutionists, Sun Yat-sen learned the lessons from the Taiping Rebellion’s defeat and
took a much more practical approach towards foreign interests in China. Sun never explicitly
declared that the revolutionary government would withdraw from all unequal treaties with
imperial powers or suspend foreign special interests in China. The revolutionist hoped to prevent
foreign intervention and to acquire recognition from the international community. Therefore, a
replacement of the Qing dynasty with the revolutionary republic hardly affects the interests of
foreign powers in China.
In addition, foreign intervention existed during the time of the Revolution of 1911 but not
during the Taiping Rebellion: the constraint of each other among great powers. During the
historical period of the Taiping Rebellion, there were only two great foreign powers, Britain and
France, that were capable of influencing the outcome of a Chinese civil war. Nevertheless, the
distribution of power among nations altered dramatically half a century later in 1911: the power
of the United States and Russia rose, and Germany and Japan also joined the world arena。
These powerful countries had sharp conflicts of interests among themselves — 1911 was only
three years before the first World War. According to The Origin Of Rebellions by Professor
Xiang Lanxin, diplomats deployed by those powerful nations to China were not dealing with the
affairs of China but rather the affairs of other powerful nations in China.18 The only thing these
imperial states had in common was that they would never allow another to expand its interests in
China alone. For example, in October 17th of 1911, Saidou Makoto, then Japanese naval
minister, ordered the third fleet of Japan to block the Yangtze River in order to intervene in the
Chinese Civil War of 1911, but London warned Tokyo not to take any action in China alone,
forcing Japan to halt.19 Under this circumstance, The U.S., supported by France and Germany,
proposed that all foreign powers may only take actions together in China, and the proposal was
agreed by other countries soon on a meeting held in Washington D.C, forming “the principle of
collective action.”20 Therefore, as illustrated above, the complex situation in China in 1911 is
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also an important reason that all those countries hold their neutral position steadily, allowing the
Xinhai revolution to ultimately overturn the Qing dynasty.
4. Different Circumstances that the Qing Government Was Under Between 1850s to 1910s
4.1 Taiping Rebellion and a Qing Government Without Significant Internal Conflicts
Prior to the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, a newly emerged class of national
capitalists sought to expand their power by pushing for a transition of governing systems from an
absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, dividing the Qing leadership. And this division
only occurred after the Taiping Rebellion as the rebellion is part of the reason that the Qing
dynasty realized its need for a westernization movement which led to the rise of national
capitalists and then their struggles towards constitutional reform.
The emergence of constitutionalists originated in the rise of capitalists as a result of the
Self-Strengthening Movement beginning in the 1860s. Half a century before the Revolution of
1911, the Qing dynasty experienced the Taiping Rebellion, which it ultimately defeated with the
help of foreign aid, and the Second Opium War, in which two western powers overwhelmed the
Chinese imperial forces. After these two upheavals, the senior-level officials of the Qing dynasty
acknowledged the superiority of western technologies yet were reluctant in recognizing the need
for political reforms. In 1864, then-governor of Jiangsu Province, Li Hongzhang submitted a
report to the Qing government, claiming that “the grand Chinese civil and military systems are
significantly more advanced than those of the west, it is merely Chinese firearms that lags far
behind.”21 Li later became one of the chief architects of the Self-Strengthening Movement and
the aforementioned therefore became the manifestation of the movement’s goal: to westernize
the Qing dynasty’s technological industry. During this time, the Qing government established the
Jianan and Tianjin Arsenals, the Fuzhou Naval Yard, the Jiangnan Manufacturing
Administration, etc. all of them are state-owned westernized industries.22 Therefore, a new class
of national capitalists had not fully emerged in China due to the state-led nature of westernized
industries.
However, this situation changed completely in 1894. The Qing Dynasty’s most
westernized and most trusted naval fleet was devastated in the First Sino-Japanese War. The
pride of the imperial governing system rooted in traditional Sinocentrism shattered as the Qing
dynasty, fully equipped with westernized technologies, lost to a none-western power, Japan.
Since then, Qing began to open up its western industry to nationals and private companies, led by
a class of capitalists, emerged. On top of this, the nation that defeated the Qing dynasty also had
a westernization movement, the Meiji Restoration, where it not only westernized its technologies
but also its governing system. By this point, the Qing government loosened its control on
industries, allowing more individuals to participate. For example, in 1901, under the invitation of
21

Hong Zhang Li, Original Letter from Jiangsu Governor to Zongli Yamen (Beijing: Xinyuan Publishing, 2013), 4.
Steven A. Leibo, Transferring Technology to China: Prosper Giquel and the Self-Strengthening Movement
(London: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), 69.
22

23

the governor of Jiangsu Province, Zhang Jian, a private industrialist established modernized
textile mills, oil plants, power plants, the province “gradually becoming an industrial
powerhouse in China.”23 Zhang, who accumulated a tremendous amount of wealth while
receiving the rank of third-class state minister in the process, became a prominent
constitutionalist. The reason that many industrialists with capital in the late Qing dynasty is that
they wished to advance their political power after achieving financial successes. According to
East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, traditional Confucianism ranked
occupations from the highest to the lowest as “gentry officials, peasant farmers, craftsmen, and
merchants.”24 Consequently, wealthy businessmen had long attempted to raise their social status
by converting their financial capital into political power. Historically, their method was to
purchase titles from governmental officials, yet these titles often came without any real power.
The Westernization Movement in the late Qing dynasty gave them hope of acquiring such
power; the influx of western information combined with Qing’s defeat to a politically
westernized Japan allowed these industrialists to push for a constitutional monarchy. Thereby,
these industrialists, who were almost all ethnically Han, may have the chance to break the
monopoly of power by the Manchurian royals. And inevitably, this would incur an internal
conflict as the absolute monarchist fought back to perverse their power.

4.2 Revolution of 1911: A Qing Government Weakened by Internal Conflicts Between
Constitutionalists and Absolute Monarchist
During the Revolution of 1911, the Qing dynasty was weakened by this internal conflict
between the constitutionalists and absolute monarchists, for the monarchists’ strong resistance
against this political reform pushed constitutionalist officials to lose hopes of getting political
power in the Qing dynasty and therefore flipped to the revolution. One of the key turning points
in the Xinhai Revolution was the defection of the Qing dynasty’s Jiangsu Governor, Dengquan
Cheng, twenty-five days after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising. Prior to his defection,
senior Qing officials were still reluctant in joining the revolutionists due to fears of losing their
property, power, or lives. Yet, the fact that Cheng, the first provincial-level Qing official to join
the revolution, was immediately reinstated as governor by the revolutionists encouraged more
and more provincial leaders to leave the side of the Qing dynasty. Within a week after Cheng’s
defection, “Governor Bingkun Shen of Guangxi Province, Governor Jiabao Zhu of Anhui
Province, Viceroy Mingqi Zhang of Guangxi and Guangdong, and Governor Baoqi Sun of
Shandong Province” all declared independence from the Qing dynasty according to The
Revolution of 1911: Turning Point in Modern Chinese History.25 Therefore, examining the
reason behind the first flipped governor becomes crucial. In the article “Considering the Yuan
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Shih-kai Commemorative Silver One Dollar” published by China Guardian, it was discovered
that Governor Cheng “telegraphed the Qing court to reshuffle the cabinet, establish a constitution
in order to counteract the revolution after the Wuchang Uprising”26 Yet, no evidence showed the
Qing government replied. And “Cheng then declared independence from the Qing dynasty.”27 In
fact, this is hardly the only event that connected Cheng to the constitutional movement. The
governor not only fully supported aforementioned industrialist Zhang Jian’s proposal to establish
a constitutional monarchy and organize a responsible cabinet, but also listed his name on
Viceroy of Manchuria Xiliang’s petition to the throne on October 25, 1910, advocating for a
political reform towards a constitutional monarchy and proving his constitutionalist identity
accordingly.28 However, all these attempts failed as the royal government refused to set up a
Parliament by 1911 which was explicitly written in the memorial. All these failures combined
pushed Governor Cheng to lose hope of any real constitutional reforms in the Qing dynasty.
Therefore, he flipped to the revolution in 1911, becoming the turning point of the Xinhai
Revolution. Since then, an increasing number of senior officials left the Qing dynasty—the
imperial dynasty lost its last supporters—making it merely a matter of time before its collapse.
5. Conclusion
The Qing dynasty managed to sustain its rule after the Taiping Rebellion since the
revolted people lacked a guiding ideology that would draw support from within the Qing
government. In fact, the mob-like ideology reflected in the rebellion united senior officials in the
Qing government to defend their lives and social status. On top of this, the Taiping Rebellion
also faced a Qing dynasty strengthened by foreign aid while the rebellion itself failed to secure
favorable foreign intervention due to its insistence on an opium ban. Finally, severe internal
conflicts that would weaken the Qing government during a domestic revolt did not come during
the 1850s as their appearances required an event like the Taiping Rebellion to trigger.
On the other hand, the Qing dynasty crumbled upon the Revolution of 1911 because the
revolution’s ideology appealed to the personal interests of senior Qing officials, breaking the
imperial dynasty from the inside. Additionally, the leader of the revolution chose a practical
approach in dealing with foreign power’s interests in China and the mutual constraints of actions
among foreign powers in China also appeared, limiting foreign intervention in the course of the
war. At last, the internal conflict between the constitutionalists and the absolute monarchist
broke out around the time of the Xinhai Revolution, further weakening the imperial dynasty.
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